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ABSTRACT

A speaker who is addressing multiple audiences has split intentions. In order to derive

the optimal benefit toward accomplishing her intentions, the speaker crafts her utterance to

be relevant to her various audiences in different ways and to differing degrees. Similarly,
the hearer will infer meaning based largely on how much he thinks that the speaker

intended her utterance to be relevant to him, while also considering how the utterance may
have been intended to be relevant to others. The goal of this paper is to describe how the

presence of multiple audiences affects both the speaker’s formation of an utterance and the

hearer’s interpretation of it. I particularly focus on utterances that are aimed at persuading

or manipulating the speaker’s various audiences. Using the framework of Relevance Theory

(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995), I analyze a hearing in which eight bank CEOs testified

before the US House Committee on Financial Services regarding how they used money that
the government had invested in their banks in the midst of a severe financial crisis. I show
that when communicating to multiple audiences, the speaker’s utterance is frequently less
than fully ostensified to his various audiences. I conclude that Relevance Theory can be
used to explain communicative stimuli that are less than fully ostensified by making a

modification to the Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption of optimal relevance to
account for such cases of scalar ostension.

x

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

As technology continues to expand our available modes of communication, it has

become easier and easier to communicate to multiple indeterminate audiences at the same
time. In literary criticism, the notion of reader response has emphasized the fact that each

reader can infer a different meaning from a single text. In a similar manner, a speaker can

actually intend to mean different things to different people through a single utterance. The
present study focuses on the properties of communicative utterances intended to be made

manifest to multiple audiences. Specifically, I will analyze a hearing (the Hearing) in which

eight Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of financial institutions testified before the Committee
of Financial Services of the US House of Representatives on February 11, 2009. Given the

tendency of those involved in a political discourse to advocate for their own positions, the

Hearing provides excellent examples of how speakers attempt to persuade or manipulate

others simultaneously across multiple audiences. While the analysis of this particular

hearing is interesting in its own right, it also serves as a useful tool to test the theoretical
claims that I will make about how communication works across multiple audiences.

To begin, I will provide the context of the hearing that serves as the primary source of

examples. Then, I will lay out the framework by which I will analyze persuasion and

manipulation. While the primary framework for my analysis is Relevance Theory (Sperber
and Wilson 1986,1995), I will make several unique elaborations and applications of

Relevance Theory with reference to persuasion, manipulation, and communication across
multiple audiences. I will also draw on recent research surrounding epistemic vigilance
1

(Sperber et al. 2010), which concerns how people choose to accept or reject information
that is communicated to them.

In addition, I will illustrate that neither persuasion nor manipulation constitutes a

linguistically separate type of communication. Rather, the extent that information differs

from persuasion or manipulation is based on non-linguistic features such as trust and
honesty.

I will close with an extended example of how the presence of multiple audiences

impacts the lexical choices of the speakers to the point that a speaker can intend a single
word to have different meanings for different audiences.

2

Chapter 2

OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDY

2.1 Setting of the Financial Crisis

In banking, reputation is supreme. If a bank loses its reputation, its depositors and

creditors will lose confidence in the bank’s ability to meet its obligations, causing it to

become illiquid (unable to meet its short-term obligations) and, therefore, to fail. When a

bank fails, the bank’s shareholders will be the first people to lose all of their financial

interest in the bank. Essentially, the shares (fractional ownership) of a failed bank are

worthless; that is, there is no benefit in owning part of a bank that is not worth anything

even when taken as a whole. If a bank is in danger of failing, there are multiple options that
could be pursued: (1) a more healthy bank could acquire the failing bank, thus causing no
loss to depositors and creditors but a substantial—if not complete—loss to the

shareholders; (2) the government or another private lender could provide emergency loans

to the troubled bank; or (3) the bank could declare bankruptcy, which will typically result in
a complete loss to shareholders, a substantial loss to creditors (entities to whom the bank

owes money), and perhaps a loss to depositors whose accounts exceed the face value of any
insurance on the deposits.

Another important characteristic of the banking industry is that companies are inter-

related. Banks lend money to each other and participate in other related transactions that
are dependent on each entity fulfilling its own part of the deal. Thus, the failure of a large

bank could be so detrimental that it could cause other banks to fail as well because the large
3

bank would be unable to fulfill its obligations to the other banks. This is known as systemic
risk (risk to the entire financial system that is inherent to the nature of how the banks are
interrelated) and is illustrated well by the image of a domino effect, in which the falling of

the first domino causes many others dominos to fall as well. The notion of systemic risk is

also illustrated by the phrase “too big to fail.” According to the too-big-to-fail philosophy,
the government knows that the failure of very large financial institutions would cause a

domino effect throughout the financial system, thus crippling the economy. As a result—so
the theory goes—the government will not allow banks to fail if it believes that the bank’s

failure would be crippling to the overall economy; rather, the government will either rescue
the potentially failing bank by providing it with loans, equity, or by forcing it to be acquired
by a healthier bank.

In September 2008, there was a severe disruption in the US financial markets. This

disruption was marked by the failure of multiple large banks and by the federal government
coming to the rescue of some specific institutions but also to the entire financial system as a

whole. Without going into too many details, one way in which the government tried to

stabilize the financial system was by purchasing $205 billion in preferred stock in various

financial institutions. This government initiative was known as the Capital Purchase

Program (CPP), which was part of the broader Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Of
the $205 billion in federal funds disbursed under the CPP, $165 billion (80.5%) were

disbursed to the eight institutions who participated in the first round of funding. 1 The US

Secretary of the Treasury encouraged these eight institutions to participate in this program

1

Technically, there were nine institutions that received funds in the first round of funding. However,
by the time of the Hearing, two of the banks had merged: Bank of America had acquired Merrill

Lynch. Because the merger was agreed upon prior to the receipt of CPP funds, I have included the

funds received by Merrill Lynch in the total of funds received by Bank of America. See Table 1, Page

5.

4

whether or not they thought they needed the money in a desire to strengthen the whole
financial system.

Table 1. List of 8 Banks that Participated in the Hearing

Bank Name
CEO Name
Goldman Sachs
Lloyd Blankfein
JP Morgan Chase
James Dimon
Bank of New York Mellon
Robert Kelly
Bank of America
Ken Lewis
State Street Corp.
Ronald Logue
Morgan Stanley
John Mack
Citigroup
Vikram Pandit
Wells Fargo
John Stumpf
Subtotal (8 banks from the Hearing)
Plus: Total funds to other banks 2
Total CPP funds:
First 8 banks as a % of total CPP funds

CPP funds received
($ billion)
10
25
3
45
2
10
45
25
165
40
205
80.50%

In essence, the government became a shareholder of financial institutions on behalf of the

US taxpayers. By investing directly in the banks, the government hoped to minimize public

fear that various banks would fail while also providing the banks with additional funds that,
in theory, they would then lend to the public. As a result of the financial crisis, it had

become increasingly difficult for individuals and companies to obtain credit. Investing

money in the banks was one way that the government hoped to meet the public’s needs for
credit.

The financial crisis affected the general public as well. As a frame of reference, the Dow

Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), which is used as a barometer to measure the value of the
US stock market, decreased drastically during the financial crisis. During the one-year

2

Total funds to other banks exclude funds provided to American International Group (AIG).

5

period illustrated in Figure 1 below, the DJIA’s closing price ranged from a high of $13,058
on May 2, 2008 to a low of $7,552 on November 20, 2008, which is a decline of 42%.
Figure 1. Closing Price of the DJIA (Feb 11, 2008 – Feb 11, 2009)

$14,000
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$9,000
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The rapid decline in stock prices drastically reduced or erased the savings of millions of US

citizens, not to mention pension funds and other investors. In addition to the drastic
reduction in personal wealth, US businesses and citizens had a very difficult time in

obtaining credit to finance their business operations, home or automobile purchases,

education expenses, etc.

While the Representatives and the CEOs were communicating directly with each other

during the Hearing, they also had indirect audiences that they were trying to please. To

begin, the members of the US House of Representatives are elected by the voters in the
areas that they represent. Consequently, the Representatives have a high level of

motivation to please their constituents, who have the power to vote them out of office
during the next elections. (US Representatives serve two-year terms.)

6

A key indirect audience of the bank CEOs includes all individuals who invest in the

stock market, including those who own shares in various financial institutions. The

shareholders of a company are the ones who own the company. They vote to elect a

company’s Board of Directors, which in turn hires and fires management and sets the

management’s compensation. Shareholders expect to earn returns on their investment in a

company. If a company is not doing well, shareholders will sell their stock to avoid losses or
seek better gains. The CEO of a company, therefore, has as a primary obligation to

maximize the value created for the shareholders. If a CEO fails his shareholders, he will

likely be fired. Not only so, but also a CEO’s compensation is typically linked somehow to

the stock price of the company. Indeed, the CEO often receives much of his compensation
in stock or stock options, thus linking the CEO’s personal wealth to the price of the

company’s stock. Consequently, a CEO has a high motivation to please his shareholders.

2.2 Setting of the Hearing

At the request of the House Committee on Financial Services (House Committee), the

CEOs of the first eight financial institutions to receive CPP funds testified before the House
Committee on February 11, 2009. They appeared before the House Committee to testify
about how they used the money that the government had invested in their respective
institutions.

Given that my goal is to analyze how communication works across multiple audiences,

some key factors to consider are (1) who are the audiences and (2) what are their goals.
Given the many potential audiences and goals, the present study will focus on four key
groups and one of their conflicting goals. The four groups include the two groups of
interlocutors, the Representatives and the eight bank CEOs, and two of the indirect

audiences, the constituents of the Representatives and the shareholders of the eight banks

(See Figure 2 below).

7

Figure 2. A Diagram of the Major Participants and Audiences
US Congress
House of Representatives

Senate

Committee on
Financial Services

Shareholders

Constituents

8 Bank CEOs
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The direct communicators in the hearing are members of the House Committee

(“Representatives”) and the eight bank CEOs. At the time of the Hearing, 61 members of the
House Committee were present: 39 Democrats and 22 Republicans. 3 Although the

Representatives have some interest in the stated purpose of the meeting, they are much

more interested in appealing to their constituents. A continual dilemma for a democratic

republic like the United States is the quest of those who are elected to be re-elected. Thus,
regardless of whom they are addressing, a chief goal of the Representatives is to please

their constituents. 4 Henry Paulson, the Secretary of the US Treasury during the onset of the

financial crisis, described the futility of congressional hearings as follows: “I considered

congressional hearings to be a waste of time. I’d never seen any piece of legislation get done
3
4

Democrats and Republicans are the two dominant political parties in the US.

Granted, I am painting a broad stereotype that does not hold true for each Representative in each

conversation. However, to a large extent, the desire to please constituents is a major constraint on
their communicative choices.
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there, never saw any compromise get worked out at a hearing. I only saw politicians

making statements meant to be seen back home” (Paulson 2011:149-150). After a specific

hearing, Paulson credited the politicians’ comments as causing a 26-27% decline in the

stock prices of two companies that were the subjects of the hearing (2011:151). Contrary
to the inefficiency of public hearings, Paulson often found that he was able to accomplish a
lot in private meetings with members of Congress.

Whereas the Representatives want to please their constituents, the CEOs desire to

please their shareholders. They are careful guardians of their institutions’ reputation. They
desire to portray their institutions as financially strong, their leadership as competent, and
their conduct as ethical. A material disclosure of weakness could ruin an institution’s

reputation and possibly cause it to fail. At the very least, a failure to protect the

shareholders’ interests would cause the institution’s stock price to decline, thus reducing
shareholder value.

While the CEOs and Representatives have a myriad of differing goals, I will focus

specifically on their respective goals to control public opinion regarding the nature of the

government’s Capital Purchase Program (CPP). On the one side, the Representatives tend
to portray the CPP as a bailout: The government came to the rescue of financially

irresponsible and greedy bankers for the dutiful protection of citizens on whose behalf the

Representatives are faithfully serving. On the other side, the bankers sidestep any notion of

wrongdoing or weakness, portraying their institutions as financially strong and ethically

responsible. Rather than being bailed out by the government, the CEOs cooperated with the
government to protect the interests of the American people.

What is at stake is public opinion, which affects both how people vote and how people

invest. Given the differing goals of the interlocutors, this hearing provides an excellent

opportunity to examine the nature of persuasion and manipulation. Since manipulation and
9

persuasion are more nuanced and precise types of communication, however, it is first
necessary to place these types of communication within a broader communicative
framework, namely that of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995).

10

Chapter 3

RELEVANCE THEORY

3.1 Speaker Meaning

In language use, at least two parties are involved: a speaker and a hearer. Even in the

case of talking to oneself or writing a personal diary for one’s own private use (or even

consciously processing internal thoughts), there is still both a speaker and her audience,

albeit that these two roles are filled by the same person. Given that an utterance has both a

speaker and a hearer, the understanding of the utterance must be examined both from the
speaker’s and the hearer’s perspectives.

Stereotypical cases of informing include showing someone something (direct evidence)

and telling someone something (indirect evidence). If a speaker wants to inform a hearer

that his favorite drinking glass has been broken, she can either show him the broken pieces

of his drinking glass or state (1).

1. “Your favorite drinking glass has been broken.”

The hearer’s understanding that his favorite glass has been broken is dependent on his

ability either to recognize the broken pieces of glass (direct evidence) or to trust the

speaker’s competence and honesty in uttering (1), “Your favorite drinking glass has been

broken” (indirect evidence). In the case of the indirect evidence, we might say that the

speaker meant for the following to happen as a result of her utterance:

2. The hearer holds the following assumption as true: “My favorite drinking glass
has been broken.”

Another way to describe what the speaker meant in the utterance (1) is as follows:
11

3.

(a) The speaker intended her utterance (1) to produce a response (2).

(b) The speaker intended for the hearer to recognize her intention (3a).

(c) The hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention (3b) served as at least
part of the reason for the hearer’s response (2).

The formulation of (3a-c) above follows along the lines of Grice’s definition of speaker

meaning: “Perhaps we may sum up what is necessary for A to mean something by x as

follows. A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also intend his
utterance to be recognized as so intended” (1957:383; see also Strawson 2002:120).

Sperber and Wilson further refine Grice’s notion of speaker meaning by describing the

speaker’s intentions as follows (1995:29):
4.

(a) Informative intention: to inform the audience of something

(b) Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative
intention.

In their model, the informative intention (4a) is similar to the Gricean model in (3a), while

the communicative intention (4b) resembles (3b). Sperber and Wilson purposefully
exclude the equivalent of (3c) from being part of speaker meaning because (3c) is

dependent on (3a) actually happening. If the hearer fails to believe that his favorite glass

has been broken, despite the utterance of the speaker, then the informative intention will
have gone unfulfilled. Thus, contrary to Grice’s notion of meaning, what the speaker
actually means by an utterance is independent of the consequences of her utterance.

In the case of the broken drinking glass, let us suppose that, at the time of the speaker’s

utterance, the hearer was distracted by some other thought and did not understand what

the speaker was trying to tell him. In this case, both the communicative intention and the

informative intention will have gone unfulfilled. The communicative intention will be

fulfilled only to the extent that a hearer understands a speaker’s meaning. The informative
12

intention, on the other hand, will be fulfilled to the extent that the hearer accepts the

speaker’s meaning and adopts the relevant assumptions into his own view of the world.

Again, the actual fulfillment of the speaker’s intentions is independent of her meaning.

The very fact that a speaker’s intentions can go unfulfilled is enough to show that human

communication is more than just the encoding and decoding of information. Words are not
codes for static representations of ideas; after all, each individual has different mental
associations with words, and the meaning of a word can change in different contexts

(Carston 2002, Moreno 2007, Wilson 2003, Wilson and Carston 2007). Although human

communication often results in misunderstandings, people must experience a great deal of

success at it, or they would have abandoned it (Sperber 2001). As Sperber and Wilson note,

“Failures in communication are to be expected: what is mysterious and requires

explanation is not failure but success” (1995:45). The key heuristic to understanding
human communication is the principle of relevance.

3.2 The Principle of Relevance

People communicate at a risk. For example, the speaker risks being misunderstood,

while the hearer risks misunderstanding what the speaker uttered. Not only are there risks

in communication, but there are also costs. The speaker exerts effort in formulating and
delivering her utterance, and the hearer exerts effort in receiving and processing the

utterance. Those who make investments with inherent risks do so in the hope of a possible
or expected benefit. In the sphere of communication, the expected benefits include the

following: “For the addressee, the normally expected benefit is to acquire some true and
relevant information. For the communicator, it is to produce some intended effect in the

addressee” (Sperber et al. 2010:360). These costs and benefits are coordinated by the same
underlying principle: the principle of relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 1995).

13

Sperber and Wilson have proposed two complementary principles of relevance: one

cognitive and the other communicative. According to the cognitive principle of relevance,
human cognition is naturally wired to maximize the amount of relevant information to an

individual. People adjust their attention to various stimuli based on their perceived notion

of benefit from these stimuli. When processing a specific utterance, the hearer processes
the utterance efficiently, following the Relevance Theoretic comprehension procedure
(Wilson and Sperber 2004:613):
5.

(a) Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in
order of accessibility.

(b) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

The cognitive principle of relevance contrasts with theories of communication that posit
that a hearer first entertains a literal meaning before entertaining a figurative meaning.
Instead, the cognitive principle of relevance posits that a hearer naturally chooses the
interpretation that satisfies his expectation of relevance. For example, consider the

following exchange between Rep. Grayson and Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit (Hearing:95)5:
6.

(a) Rep. Grayson: Have you heard the phrase, Mr. Pandit, “Heads, I win; tails,
you lose?”

(b) Mr. Pandit: I appreciate that, Congressman. I don’t think it applies here.

In his remarks, Rep. Grayson accused Citigroup of trying to cheat the US government—and

therefore the US taxpayers—by entering into an arrangement whereby Citigroup would be
assured a benefit while the US government would be assured a loss. While Rep. Grayson

phrased his accusation as a question—likely so that he could deny making an accusation if
5

For direct quotations from the transcript of the Hearing, I will simply list Hearing and the page
number in the in-text citation. The full citation is in the Reference section.
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so accused, Mr. Pandit successfully interpreted the utterance as an accusation. Rather than

answering his question, Mr. Pandit denied the accusation, saying, “I don’t think it applies

here” (6b). According to the cognitive principle of relevance, Mr. Pandit did not have to

reject the literal interpretation of this utterance’s propositional form (a question) before
assigning a different illocutionary force to the utterance. Mr. Pandit had no reason to

believe that a literal answer to Rep. Grayson’s question (whether or not he had ever heard

of a certain phrase) would have been relevant to either the inquirer or any other indirect

audience. On the other hand, the interpretation as an accusation would have been both

immediately accessible and relevant to everyone. Therefore, Mr. Pandit understood Rep.

Grayson’s utterance as an accusation without first entertaining and dismissing a literal

interpretation.

The cognitive principle of relevance forms the basis for a second, or communicative,

principle of relevance, which states that every act of ostensive communication

communicates (1) that it is worth the hearer’s processing effort and (2) that it is designed

to achieve the optimal amount of relevance for the hearer (net effect of processing costs and
cognitive benefits), constrained by the speaker’s own abilities and preferences. At first, this
might sound as though the speaker is expected to act to her own disadvantage in order to

accommodate the hearer, but it actually says that the speaker will act in her own best

interests. As stated earlier, the speaker’s communicative motivation is to produce an

intended effect in her audience. Therefore, the speaker is motivated to produce a stimulus

that will most effectively and efficiently enable the hearer to infer her intended meaning. If
her utterance is too difficult to process, then the hearer will abandon his processing of it as

soon as he believes that it is no longer worth his effort. Of course, a speaker invests only as

much effort into formulating an utterance as she expects her efforts to help her achieve her
own goals. Similarly, a hearer does not expect a speaker to utter something that runs
15

contrary to her own goals, abilities, or preferences. The communicative principle of

relevance is motivated by the fact that both the speaker and the hearer are presumed to be
pursuing their own best interests.

However, in order for a speaker to presume that her ostensive act of communication

will be worth the hearer’s attention and processing effort, she must have a reasonable

expectation of what would be relevant to the hearer. Not only so, she must also have a

reasonable expectation of how to produce a stimulus that would allow the hearer to recover

a representation of the thought that she was trying to communicate. In other words, the

communicators must have the ability to generate metarepresentations, (representations of

other representations). For example, an intention is a representation of a desirable state of
affairs. To attribute an intention to someone else is to metarepresent because it involves

forming a representation in one’s own mind of a representation in someone else’s mind.

According to Sperber (1994:187), attributing intentions to others is a defining aspect of (at
least adult) human communication:

Very few animals have any meta-representational ability. There is some

experimental and anecdotal evidence suggesting that chimpanzees and possibly
other non-human primates do possess some such ability in a rudimentary form.

What about humans? Do they have a meta-representational ability? Do birds fly?
Do fish swim? Humans can no more refrain from attributing intentions than they

can from batting their eyelids. The only issue regarding humans is developmental:

at which age and through what stages do meta-representational abilities develop, if
they are not there from the start?

These claims presume that communication is mainly an inferential process, whereby the

utterance is merely a clue of the speaker’s intended meaning. Just as the speaker has to

make assumptions about how her stimulus will be relevant to her audience, so the hearer
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has to make assumptions about how the speaker intended her utterance to be relevant. The
ability to metarepresent enables human communication to be so efficient.

Continuing on the topic of metarepresentation, consider the following excerpt from

Rep. Capuano’s comments to the CEOs (Hearing:57):

7. Rep. Capuano (to all the CEOs): I cannot believe that no one has prosecuted you
[for how your banks’ complex legal structures allowed you to incur excessive

risk]....my hope is that you will be answering those questions in court some day.

It would be hard for any adult to read Rep. Capuano’s comments without attributing certain

intentions to him, for example, that he intends the CEOs to know that he thinks their

behavior was criminal (an informative intention). Even the propositional form of Rep.

Capuano’s utterance is itself a representation of a thought in his own mind. The utterance
does not fully convey his thought but is merely an interpretation or representation of it.

(For more on this, see the Underdeterminacy Thesis in Carston 2002, Moreno 2007.) The

chart in Figure 3 (below) (adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1995:232; see also Carston

2002:331) maps how an utterance can be interpreted. In the right margin, I have included

the mapping of the utterance from Example (7) for comparison.
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Figure 3: Utterance Interpretation
a mental representation of the speaker

which she interprets into

the speaker's thought, which
is only partially expressed by
the utterance
which Rep. Capuano
interprets into

an utterance

"My hope is that you will be
answering these questions
in court one day."

which can be entertained as

which the hearer entertains
as

an interpretation of

a description of

an interpretation of

another representation

a state of affairs

the representation that Rep.
Capuano has in his mind

which can be entertained as

an interpretation of
another representation
(and so on ad infinitum )

which the hearer entertains
as (a belief of Rep.
Capuano)

a state of affairs

a state of affairs in which the
CEOs behaved criminally

In review of Figure 3 and Example (7), the hearer uses the speaker’s utterance as

evidence from which he infers what she intended.

In summary, the communicative principle of relevance posits that every ostensive

utterance communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance. This implicit

presumption allows the hearer to interpret the stimulus with an expectation that the

speaker is trying to be relevant.

3.3 Relevance

So far I have argued along the tenets of Relevance Theory that people desire to obtain

relevance. But what is relevance? In general terms, people’s pursuit of relevance is their
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pursuit to improve their understanding of the world. Since the notion of improving

something is a comparative notion, it follows that some stimuli will be more relevant than

others. It also follows that some things can cause relevance to increase while others cause
relevance to decrease.

The main item that decreases the relevance of an utterance is the processing effort

required to interpret the utterance, which is dependent on factors such as the accessibility

of a given context or the processing abilities of the individual. While the cost of relevance is
measured in processing effort, the benefits are measured in cognitive effects. Cognitive

effects generally fall into one of the following three categories: (1) contextual implications,
(2) contradictions of previous assumptions, or (3) the strengthening an existing

assumption. All three types of cognitive effects are demonstrated clearly in the following

dialogue between the Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis and Rep. Foster. Prior to Mr. Lewis’

initial comment below, Rep. Foster had asked the eight CEOs about the worst-case planning
scenarios that they had entertained prior to the height of the financial crisis (Hearing:90).
8.

(a) Mr. Lewis: We had [adequately prepared for a] 30 percent decline in real
estate prices about a year ago.

(b) Rep. Foster: “So you saw this [financial crisis] coming and were relatively
quiet about it for quite a while.”

(c) Mr. Lewis: “No.”

(d) Rep. Foster: “You gamed out a survival strategy.”
(e) Mr. Lewis: “Right.”

(f) Rep. Foster: “That is different.”

Let us see how each of Mr. Lewis’ comments achieved relevance for Rep. Foster. Mr. Lewis’

utterance in Example (8a) achieved relevance by combining with other assumptions of Rep.
Grayson to yield contextual implications. In this case, Mr. Lewis’ statement about his
19

company’s worst-case scanning scenario served as an input for the contextual implication

that Rep. Foster then stated in Example (8b). The process by which Rep. Foster derived the

contextual implication (8b) may have gone like this:
9.

(a) Assumption (implicated premise): If one plans for a certain scenario, then

he must have a reasonable expectation that the scenario will happen. (If P1,

then Q1)

(b) Assumption (from Example (8a)): Mr. Lewis planned for a crisis scenario a

year in advance. (P1, therefore Q1: Mr. Lewis had a reasonable expectation
that the financial crisis would happen.)

(c) Assumption (implicated premise): If Mr. Lewis had a reasonable

expectation that the financial crisis would happen a year in advance and did
not do anything to warn the rest of the economy, he is at least partly to

blame for the financial crisis. (If Q1 and P2, then Q2.)

(d) Assumption (8b): Mr. Lewis did not do anything to warn the rest of the
economy. (P2)

(e) Contextual implication from Example (8b): Mr. Lewis is at least partly to
blame for the financial crisis. (Q1 and P2, therefore Q2)

To achieve relevance by means of contextual implication (as illustrated above), the

processing of the utterance must combine with other assumptions to yield implications that

were worth the hearer’s processing effort to derive and that were not available without the
premises derived from the utterance. For instance, in the Example (8) above, Rep. Foster

could not have derived (8b) unless Mr. Lewis had uttered (8a).

Another type of relevance that would improve one’s understanding of the world is to

have a previously held assumption contradicted. This type of cognitive effect is illustrated

by Mr. Lewis’ response, “No,” in (8c). By stating, “No,” Mr. Lewis contradicted Rep. Foster’s
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implicated premise (8b/9e). By simply uttering “No,” Mr. Lewis did not make explicit how

he was contradicting Rep. Foster’s implicated premise. He could have been contradicting

one or both of Rep. Foster’s assumptions as in the following (non-exhaustive, hypothetical

list):

10.

(a) Contradicting (9c): As a private citizen, I have no duty to protect the rest of
the country. My duty is to my company, not the US people.

(b) Contradicting (9a): Even though I planned for a worst-case scenario, I did

not expect the worst-case scenario to come true. By definition, my worstcase scenario should be more pessimistic than my expected case.

As it turns out, Rep. Foster understood Ken Lewis to mean something along the lines of

(10b) rather than (10a). This can be explained by Rep. Foster’s expectation of relevance.
He would not expect for Ken Lewis purposefully to come across as arrogant and

inconsiderate of the US people as in (10a); after all, the bankers were trying to portray

themselves as morally responsible, thus shifting blame for the financial crisis off

themselves. One attitude that the bankers were trying to convey was expressed succinctly
earlier in the hearing by the Wells Fargo CEO, John Stumpf (Hearing:20):

11. John Stumpf: “We are Americans first, and we are bankers second.”

Thus, Rep. Foster was quickly able to infer which premise Mr. Lewis was questioning. Rep.

Foster even corrected his previous implication (8b/9e) by stating (8d), “You gamed out a

survival strategy then.” Mr. Lewis then responded (8e), “Right,” which provided relevance

by strengthening Rep. Foster’s assumption that Mr. Lewis’ worst-case scenario was created
in order to help his own company survive. Without being explicitly refuted, Rep. Foster

abandoned his prior implicature that Mr. Lewis behaved irresponsibly by not warning the
general public.
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Some utterances do not produce cognitive effects and, therefore, do not yield relevance

to an individual (that is, do not improve his understanding of the world) (Sperber and

Wilson 1995:120-121), or at least they do not yield relevance in the way that the speaker
intended. In order for an utterance to be relevant to an individual, the hearer must have
access to a context from which he will be able to derive true contextual implications, to

contradict previously held assumptions, or to strengthen previously held assumptions. The
communicative exchange between Rep. Foster and Mr. Lewis (8a-f) illustrates the

importance of context in interpreting an utterance. Contextual factors about their

knowledge, their goals, and their expectations helps one understand the meaning behind
their utterances. In order to provide a more precise description of the communicative

process, it is now necessary for me to refine how contextual factors influence utterance
interpretation.

3.4 Cognitive Environments

The notion of context tends to refer to a wide variety of factors that contribute to the

way that an utterance is understood. I will employ some more precise terms from

Relevance Theory to specify the context for each participant in a communicative exchange.
To begin, an individual’s cognitive environment consists of all the assumptions that are

manifest to him at a given moment. To be manifest in a given moment, an assumption
either needs to be perceivable from one’s environment or inferable based on the
assumptions of the individual (Sperber and Wilson 1995:38-46).

Each person has a unique cognitive environment that is dependent both on physical

and cognitive factors. Regarding the physical environment, the things that someone can

hear, smell, see, taste, and feel all affect the assumptions that are manifest to him; the

factors of one’s physical environment are—or would be if noticed—processed through the
individual’s cognitive system. The purely cognitive factors that affect one’s cognitive
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environment include his logical and encyclopaedic entries. A logical entry provides rules or
instructions on how to process information. Examples of logical entries include deductive
rules such as “If P, then Q” or the logical meaning of the word and. Encyclopaedic entries,

on the other hand, store information about properties of things, memories, and other items
that describe a conceptual representation rather than a strictly logical form. When

processing thoughts, one typically combines encyclopaedic and logical entries to form full
thoughts.

Two people can have similar items manifest to them at the same time. For instance,

two people in the same room have access to a lot of the same physical observations about
the room; their environments are not entirely equal, however, because that they occupy

different spaces within the room and have different perceptual abilities. Likewise, each

person has different experiences, different associations with words, and different cognitive

abilities. Thus, there are certain parts of a speaker’s cognitive environment that she shares
with her audience, while there are other parts that are different. Consider Figure 4 below:
Figure 4. Mutual Cognitive Environment

In a conversation between Rep. Posey and Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis, the square

represents the cognitive environment of Rep. Posey and the circle that of the Mr. Lewis.
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The shaded area of overlap between these two environments represents their mutual

cognitive environment. The mutual cognitive environment represents the assumptions

that are manifest to both the Representative and the CEO; these assumptions are considered
to be mutually manifest.

When Rep. Posey addresses an utterance toward Mr. Lewis, for instance, it is mutually

manifest that Rep. Posey is making claims on Mr. Lewis’ attention, thereby presuming that

his utterance will yield contextual effects that will be worth Mr. Lewis’ attention to process.
Mr. Lewis, then, is justified in having expectations of relevance. First let us consider an
actual conversation from the Hearing (73):
12.

(a) Rep. Posey: “Mr. Lewis, you are Mr. Countrywide, Mr. Bank of America?”

(b) Mr. Lewis: “No, I am not Mr. Countrywide.”

As background information to Example (12), Rep. Posey’s utterance is a question because

he was calling on Mr. Lewis to provide a second opinion to a question that he had just posed
to Mr. Blankfein of Goldman Sachs. (The specific question is not relevant to this example; it

is simply relevant that Rep. Posey was not merely questioning Mr. Lewis’ name.) As

additional background information, Bank of America had acquired Countrywide, a bank that

was in severe financial distress at the time that it was acquired. Countrywide was notorious
for having very poor lending standards, which was a big cause of the financial crisis. Mr.

Lewis had gone to great lengths to separate the reputation of Bank of America from that of
the weaker banks that it had acquired, namely Countrywide and Merrill Lynch. These

background assumptions were highly accessible to both interlocutors.

Relevance Theory claims that mutually manifest assumptions guide the hearer in how to

attribute intentions to the speaker. While Rep. Posey’s statement surely produced a variety

of contextual effects for Mr. Lewis, let us consider how Mr. Lewis could have deduced the

contextual implication (13e):
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13.

(a) Mutual assumption: I am the CEO of the company that acquired
Countrywide. (P1)

(b) Mutual assumption: Countrywide played a significant role in causing the
current financial crisis. (P2)

(c) Implicated premise attributed by Mr. Lewis to Rep. Posey based on the
utterance (12a): If I am the CEO of the company that acquired

Countrywide and if Countrywide played a significant role in causing the

financial crisis, then I am responsible for playing a significant role in the
financial crisis. (If P1 and P2, then Q.)

(d) Contextual Implication: I played a significant role in causing the financial
crisis. (P1 and P2, therefore Q)

Without missing a beat, Mr. Lewis rejected the implicated premise (13c) and the contextual

implication (13d) by stating (12b): “No, I am not Mr. Countrywide.”

Mr. Lewis’ ability to assign intentionality to Rep. Posey’s utterance illustrates that Mr.

Lewis has the ability to construct a representation of what he thought that Rep. Posey was

thinking. Following Sperber (1994), I will place each successive layer of representation on
a separate line.

14. (a) Rep. Posey intends

(b) me [Mr. Lewis] to know
(c) that he intends

(d) me to accept as true

(e) that he believes

(f) that I played a significant role in causing
the financial crisis.
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Let us work through each of the layers of these representations. The first two layers (14a-

b) simply posit that Mr. Posey had a communicative intention: He intended to communicate
that he had an informative intention. The next two layers (14c-d) constitute the

informative intention: He intended to inform Mr. Lewis of something. The final 2 layers

(14e-f) would typically include the representation of the thought that Rep. Posey wanted
Mr. Lewis to believe. However, Rep. Posey could not have reasonably expected for Mr.

Lewis to accept a self-incriminating proposition such as (14f). Therefore, both Rep. Posey

and Mr. Lewis must attribute the belief in (14e-f) to someone else. As I suggested in (14e),
for Mr. Lewis to attribute this belief to Mr. Posey is at least one possibility; unless he were
speaking deceitfully, it would generally be expected that he would accept as true the

propositions of whose truth he was trying to inform others. Given that he was not trying to

inform Mr. Lewis of the proposition (14f), he may have been trying to inform some other

audiences, such as the following:
15.

(a) Possible relevance of (14f) to Rep. Posey’s constituents:

By placing blame on Mr. Lewis, Rep. Posey might be identifying with the
opinion of his constituents, who had great anger toward the banking

industry. By finding someone else to blame, his constituents might be less

likely to blame him.

(b) Possible relevance of (14f) to Rep. Posey’s fellow Representatives:

He might be trying to convince his fellow Representatives that the banking
industry deserves the distress that it is in. Perhaps he desires to push a
political agenda that is punitive to banks.

At any rate, I have now laid the foundations of Relevance Theory sufficiently to explore

more complicated issues such as communication across multiple audiences, persuasion, and
manipulation. These will be the main subjects of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4

COMMUNICATION ACROSS MULTIPLE AUDIENCES

4.1 Implications of the Mutual Cognitive Environment

The Hearing before the House Committee on Financial services was nationally

televised. The transcript and video of the Hearing are public records. Even during the

hours of the Hearing, the words of the CEOs and the Representatives impacted the stock

prices of the banks. On a more delayed note, the behavior of the politicians contributed to
their reputation and, ultimately, to their ability to be re-elected. While relatively few

shareholders or constituents probably paid attention to the details of the Hearing, the

movers and shakers of the stock market, the media, and the political engine digested the

Hearing on their behalf.

Because the Hearing was a matter of public discourse, the politicians and CEOs

certainly spoke differently than they would have spoken if the Hearing had taken place in a

confidential environment. But why? And how? The answer to both of these questions rests
in the Relevance Theoretic notion of the mutual cognitive environment. If the Hearing had

been confidential, one of the mutually manifest assumptions (to the CEOs and

Representatives) would have been the very fact that the Hearing was confidential. In such a

confidential setting, the utterances could have been processed only by the CEOs and the

Representatives themselves and not by the public at large. As a result, the interlocutors

would have strived to achieve relevance only for those who had access to their utterances.

Under the actual scenario, however, in which it was mutually manifest that the Hearing was

a matter of public discourse, the CEOs and the Representatives knew that the general public
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would have immediate access to their utterances. Thus, the interlocutors sought to achieve
relevance not only with each other but also with the indirect audiences in whom they
wanted to produce certain effects.

Granted, speakers do not strive to achieve relevance to each of the myriad possible

audiences who might have access to their utterances. Rather, speakers prioritize their

efforts to achieve relevance according to their higher-level plans and intentions. After all,
the motivation of a speaker is to produce an intended effect in her audience. Therefore, a

speaker exerts only as much effort in formulating and delivering an utterance as she expects
her effort to benefit her by producing intended effects in her audiences. To the extent that a
speaker’s intention to produce an effect in one audience is greater than her intention to

produce an effect in a different audience, her higher-ranked intention will take priority over
her lower-ranked intention. In an ideal world, the speaker would love to accomplish both
the higher- and lower-ranked intentions. When these intentions are in conflict with each
other, however, the speaker’s utterance can provide clues about which intention was

primary.

For instance, the following dialogue between Rep. King and Morgan Stanley’s CEO John

Mack illustrates this point. Before examining this example, however, we need some

background information. The banking industry is highly regulated. That is, there are

various government entities that set rules for banks that are under their supervision; these
entities are called regulators. The regulators examine the banks for compliance with their

rules and also have the power to punish banks that are not in compliance. A single bank
could have numerous regulators, each overseeing compliance for a different area of risk

within the bank. The severity of the financial crisis exposed a major flaw in the fragmented

regulatory framework: No single regulator had a comprehensive view of a bank’s risk

profile. As a result, there was considerable discussion about the possibility of creating a
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systemic risk regulator that would have a comprehensive view of a bank’s risk profile. In

light of this background information, now consider Example (16):
16.

(a) Rep. King: If we establish this systemic risk regulator, which existing
regulators would this replace?

(b) Mr. Mack: There needs to be, I believe, a coming together of regulatory

oversight. So that is at the first level. And I think it is up to a number of

hearings and discussions on how that takes place, but I would like to see a
combination of some of our regulators.

In (16a) Rep. King asks a very specific question about which regulatory agencies should be

shut down if a new systemic risk regulator were established. This presented a problem for
Mr. Mack: He likely wanted to answer the question completely and honestly, but he could
not do so because he knew that the regulators would hear his answer. This would be like

asking an employee to state which of his supervisors should be fired while it was mutually
manifest that the supervisors were listening to the employee’s answer. If the employee

says, “You should fire supervisors Smith, Jones, and Williams,” then the employee might face

negative repercussions from any supervisors who were not fired. Thus, the employee is

likely to provide a sincere and complete answer only if he expects his reply to result in the

immediate firing of the supervisors, thus avoiding any negative repercussions. On a similar

note, Mr. Mack knows that his opinion will not result in the immediate termination of any of

his regulators. After all, changes in government move very slowly because of all the
bureaucracy. Therefore, in his response in (16b), Mr. Mack affirms that some of the
agencies should be replaced but he does not name any specific regulator for fear of

retaliation. However, if the Hearing had been confidential, Mr. Mack would likely have

taken the opportunity to speak more openly about which regulators he considered to be

unnecessary. As a result, his vague response reveals that his desire to please his regulators
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was greater than his desire to answer Rep. King’s question fully. Furthermore, Mr. Mack’s

desire to please his regulators is based in his desire to please his shareholders. If pleasing

the regulators is good for the company, then pleasing the regulators is good for the
shareholders as well.

Another implication of the existence of multiple mutual cognitive environments is that

a speaker can use a single proposition to mean different things to different people. In

formulating her utterance, a speaker anticipates how the hearer will infer meaning from it.

Thus, to the extent that she cares about the effects on each audience, she will consider how
her utterance will be interpreted by each addressee based on what she considers to be the
mutual cognitive environments of her addressees.

In assessing how to be relevant to her target audiences, the speaker is aware of

multiple ways in which her audiences’ cognitive environments differ:
17.

(a) Different physical environments: Some assumptions are perceivable based
on one’s surroundings and, therefore manifest to that individual. No two

people share the exact same physical environment.

(b) Different cognitive abilities: People have different abilities to perceive and
process information.

(c) Different assumptions: In processing an utterance, the hearer uses his

previously held assumptions to infer meaning. When a new utterance is

processed against previously held assumptions, four possibilities are (1)
combining with assumptions to yield new contextual implications; (2)

contradicting previously held assumptions; (3) strengthening previously
held assumptions; or (4) having no direct effect on previously held

assumptions because of a lack of a context where the utterance is relevant.
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(d) Different expectations of relevance: Each hearer has expectations of how a

speaker is trying to be relevant to him. He processes an utterance to obtain

the contextual effects that are most readily accessible to him, stopping

when his expectations of relevance have been satisfied or when the cost of
further processing outweighs the expected benefit.

The speaker uses her assumptions about these differences in guiding her addressees’

interpretations of her utterance. Sperber and Wilson’s analogy of dancing fits the situation

(1995:43):

Co-ordination problems are avoided, or considerably reduced, in dancing by leaving
the responsibility to one partner who leads, while the other has merely to follow.

We assume that the same goes for communication. It is left to the communicator to
make correct assumptions about the codes and contextual information that the

audience will have accessible and be likely to use in the comprehension process.

Indeed, communication is speaker-initiated. As stated in the communicative principle of

relevance, each ostensive act of communication comes with an implicit presumption of its

optimal relevance.

4.2 Scalar Ostension and the Idealized Target Audience

The presumption of optimal relevance is applicable only to acts of ostensive

communication. When a speaker makes it obvious that she is trying to communicate with

an addressee, she communicates that she intends for her utterance to be optimally relevant

to the hearer. When she does not make it obvious that she is communicating to a particular

audience (hiding her communicative intention), her audience still might gain relevant

information from the utterance. However, because the speaker makes no claims on her

audience’s attention, she also does not imply that her stimulus will be worth her audience’s
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attention. The non-ostensively communicated stimulus may very well be relevant to an
audience, but it does not come with a presumption of its relevance to that audience.

Thus far, I have spoken of communication as being either ostensive or non-ostensive.

Ostensive communication carries a presumption of optimal relevance, while non-ostensive

communication does not. In their discussion of ostension, though, Sperber and Wilson note
that there is a range of ostension that goes from “showing” (providing direct evidence) to

“saying that” (providing indirect evidence). Yet their mention of a “continuum of cases of

ostension” requires more specific elaboration (1995:53). Sperber and Wilson’s discussed

the “continuum of cases of ostension” in relation to providing direct evidence (showing)

versus indirect evidence (telling), both of which would still be ostensive communication. In

this interpretation, the “continuum of cases of ostension” has epistemological implications
such as suggesting that an audience processes direct demonstrative evidence similarly to

indirect testimony. A model of this continuum might look like the following:
Figure 5. Continuum of Cases of Ostension

Direct Evidence

Indirect Evidence

Showing

Telling

Yet there is another possible application of the idea of a continuum of cases of

ostension. For instance, a speaker could be more or less obvious as to how much she

intends her stimulus to be relevant to a particular audience. I will refer to this concept as

scalar ostension. By the term scalar, I am positing that there is not a clear dichotomy

between ostensive and non-ostensive communication. Rather, a particular stimulus will fall
somewhere on a scale of being more or less ostensive.
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Figure 6. Scalar Ostension
More ostensive

Not ostensive

The purpose of positing scalar ostension is to show that a speaker can vary the strength of
her ostension to a particular audience, which will directly affect the degree to which she

presumes that her stimulus will be relevant to her audience. From the hearer’s perspective,

the perceived strength of the ostension will impact his expectation of relevance, which will
affect the amount of processing effort that he is willing to invest in pursuit of cognitive

benefits.

As a clarification, scalar ostension does not always provide a useful comparison. In

particular, as communication becomes more and more ostensive, the value in comparing
the differences in ostension trends asymptotically toward zero. The same is true on the

other side of the ostension spectrum. Comparison can also be difficult or unfruitful in cases

in which multiple variables have changed. However, in cases in which the level of ostension

varies slightly, especially in ambiguous cases, there is much comparative value. In

particular, later on I will illustrate how scalar ostension helps to explain the communication
from the Hearing.

If my notion of scalar ostension is accurate, a revision of the communicative principle

of relevance would be warranted as follows (my change to Sperber and Wilson 1995:260 is
in italics): “Every act of fully ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its
own optimal relevance.” This revision is not a contradiction of Sperber and Wilson’s

Relevance Theory, whose domain was exclusively ostensive communication and for which

this caveat would be superfluous. Rather, it is an expansion of the application of Relevance

Theory to communicative domains that, while still being ostensive, may not be fully

ostensive. I will make my revision to the communicative principle of relevance even more
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explicit: “The degree to which an act of communication is ostensive to an individual is the

degree to which it presumes to be optimally relevant to that individual.” This elaboration of
the communicative principle of relevance provides key insights when analyzing
communication across multiple, indeterminate audiences.

Sperber and Wilson provide other hints of the possibility of scalar ostension. One such

hint, already mentioned, is their mentioning of a “continuum of cases of ostension”

(1995:53). A stronger hint, though, is in their brief comment about how the presumption of
relevance works in relation to indeterminate audiences (1995:158):

The addressees of an act of ostensive communication are the individuals whose

cognitive environment the communicator is trying to modify. They can be specific

individuals, as when Mary addresses Peter, or they may be individuals falling under
a certain description, as when we address the present paragraph to all individuals
who have read the book so far and found it relevant to them. In broadcast

communication, a stimulus can even be addressed to whoever finds it relevant. The
communicator is then communicating her presumption of relevance to whoever is
willing to entertain it.

Sperber and Wilson’s description of ostensive communication above discusses the

possibility of a speaker offering a presumption of relevance (which requires that the

speaker be ostensive about her communication) to an indeterminate audience such as a

hypothetical reader of a book or a hypothetical audience of broadcast communication. I will
explore both of these illustrations in detail.

In the case of a reader of a book, the reader adjusts his expectations of relevance in

real-time as he reads the book. If he finds his expectations of relevance satisfied, then he

will be willing to invest more processing effort into the author’s utterances because of his

trust in the author’s willingness and ability to offer stimuli that improve his understanding
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of the world. The reader also adjusts his expectations of relevance based on the topic or

even on the basis of formatting (bold font, italics, underlining) or the location within the

larger document (footnote, section heading, topic sentence, abstract, conclusion, etc.). Even
if the reader had never had any prior experience with a particular author or publisher, he
could gain an increasingly strong expectation of to whom the author had intended his

writing to be optimally relevant. For example, publicly traded companies issue annual

financial statements. To some degree, the company presumes that its financial statements

will be relevant to anyone who finds them interesting. The casual reader could probably

figure out, for example, whether or not the company was operating at a profit or a loss and

derive some cognitive effects from that information. However, a skilled financial analyst
would be able to reap a lot more relevant information from the same communication

because his cognitive environment shares a larger overlap with the authors’ idealized target
audience. In the case of a written public document (a published book, a public report, etc.),

it is true that—as Sperber and Wilson suggested—the written communication is relevant to
anyone who finds it interesting (1995:158). However, the presumption of optimal

relevance (versus the presumption of some relevance) would be true only for the idealized

target audience.

I will elaborate on the example of the company’s public financial statements to

illustrate that both internal (indirect: “telling that”) and external (direct: “showing that”)

evidence contribute to the presumption of relevance from the speaker and the expectation

of relevance from the hearer. The external (direct) evidence refers to the manner of

delivery in making it ostensive that a speaker is making claims on her audience’s attention,
while the internal (indirect) evidence refers to the audience’s ability to estimate the

idealized target audience based on the content of the utterance. In terms of direct evidence,

a company could ostensify its presumption of relevance related to its financial statements to
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different degrees: by mailing some people a hard copy while making an electronic copy

accessible to the general public on the company’s website. Even though they ostensified

their presumption of relevance in external terms more to the people to whom they mailed
the hard copy than to the indeterminate audiences who were required to take their own

initiative to access the electronic copy on the company’s website, this does not mean that
the people who received a mailed copy were promised more relevance. Rather, while
reading the document, the reader would construct an opinion about how closely he

resembles the idealized target audience (based upon both the direct and indirect evidence)
and would adjust his expectations of relevance accordingly.

The same principle is true for other types of communication across multiple audiences.

For instance, a local newspaper does not presume to be equally relevant to all of its

subscribers even though the publishers make their external ostension the same to all

subscribers by delivering the same newspaper to their houses. Even within a particular

edition of the newspaper, certain articles or advertisements will be optimally relevant to

different readers based on their respective cognitive environments. The publishers of the
newspaper realize that they are serving a wide variety of audiences: local residents and

visitors, the old and the young, those looking for a job and those who are not. However, by

limiting the presumption of relevance to whoever finds it interesting, Sperber and Wilson

have delinked the presumption of relevance from the ostensive nature of the

communication (1995:158). Certainly, the fact that someone estimates that he falls within
the author’s idealized target audience is convincing internal evidence that the text comes
with a presumption of some relevance to that individual. However, there is also the

external evidence to consider. The external evidence that the publishers delivered the
newspaper to some, but not all, residents in a town indicates that the publishers had

presumed some relevance to their specific customers. Indeed, without subscribers the
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newspaper would go out of business. Thus, the newspaper publisher has split interests

because she is addressing a wide variety of audiences (subscribers, the general public,

whoever finds it interesting) and has a variety of intentions (to please the subscribers, to
please the advertisers, to produce good journalism). The newspaper publisher will

calibrate the stimulus (the newspaper, both external and internal evidence) to accomplish
the maximum benefit based on how she ranks her various priorities.

The distinction between internal and external evidence of ostension has clear

applications in the case of the Hearing. On the one hand, the CEOs and Representatives
provided external evidence of their communicative intentions by showing that they

intended to communicate with each other: They addressed each other, often by name; they
made eye contact with each other; and they exchanged written statements that would later
become public records. On the other hand, an internal analysis of their conversations
reveals that their idealized target audiences were frequently the shareholders and

constituents. Granted, the notion of scalar ostension does not allow an authoritative

calculation of who the primary audience was, but it can certainly provide clues. We can

examine the external evidence and the internal evidence to form judgments about how the

various speakers presumed their utterances to be relevant to their respective audiences. In
reality, the weighting of the internal and external evidence will vary from audience to
audience and from occasion to occasion.

A key contribution in the notion of scalar ostension is the recognition that a speaker

can presume some, not necessarily optimal, relevance to an audience when she is trying to
communicate to multiple audiences at the same time. Further, this presumption of

relevance varies with the level of ostension of the speaker’s utterance. A Representative

who has multiple intentions (i.e. a desire to produce an effect in the CEOs, a desire to
produce an effect in her constituents, a desire to produce an effect in her fellow
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Representatives, etc.) will—typically subconsciously—weight the priorities of these effects

to try to achieve a maximal benefit from her utterance. Likewise, a hearer can expect that a
speaker is providing him with some, but not necessarily optimal, relevance, if he suspects
that the speaker has intended her utterance to produce effects in other people besides
himself.

Next, let us consider Sperber and Wilson’s other example of an indeterminate audience,

namely that of the audience of a broadcast communication, to whom the speaker presumed

that her utterance would be relevant “to whoever is willing to entertain it” (1995:158). As a

specific example of broadcast communication, let us consider a televised news program.
The producers of the program clearly realize that their different audiences will gain

different amounts of relevance from a particular utterance 6 based on factors such as the
audience’s command of the broadcast language, familiarity with the content of the

utterance, sympathy toward the political bias of the producers, and so on. For any given
utterance, the producers presume optimal relevance only for their idealized target

audience. However, given the public nature of broadcast communication, each hearer

expects that the producers intended some degree of relevance to all of their audiences,

variable based on the degree to which each hearer fits within the producer’s idealized target
audience. The hearer adjusts his expectation of relevance in real-time based on how well

his expectations of relevance are being satisfied. The notion of an idealized target audience
does not require a hearer to possess a priori knowledge of the idealized target audience.

Rather, the hearer naturally adjusts his expectations of relevance throughout the broadcast
communication event.

6

Or, as Unger (2006) properly notes, a speaker can presume relevance across a series of connected
utterances, which is more appropriate for analyzing complex stimuli of more than one utterance.
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Sperber and Wilson addressed the possibility of entertaining an ostensive intention

beyond the communicative intention, but they dismissed this as unnecessary (1995:30-

31,60-64). Their reason for dismissing the need to appeal to an ostensive intention was

essentially that they had limited the domain of the principles of relevance to ostensive acts
of communication. In their model, the ostensive intention is conflated with the

communicative intention, in which case it is “mutually manifest to audience and

communicator that the communicator has [an] informative intention” (1995:61). This is

true for fully ostensive communication, in which case the ostensive nature of the

communication is mutually manifest to the speaker and hearer. However, in cases of
communication to an indeterminate audience or other cases of scalar ostension, it is
necessary to detangle the ostensive and the communicative intentions. Thus, I have
separated these intentions as follows:

Table 2. Speaker’s Intentions

Intention

Ostensive
intention

Communicative
intention
Informative
intention

Speaker's desire to…
inform the hearer of the degree to
which she presumes her stimulus
to be relevant to him
inform the hearer of her
informative intention

inform the hearer of some
assumption

Intention is accomplished
to the extent that…
the hearer recognizes the degree to
which the speaker presumes her
stimulus to be relevant to him
the hearer understands the
assumption of which the speaker is
trying to inform him
the hearer accepts as true the
assumption of which the speaker is
trying to inform him

My elaboration of Sperber and Wilson’s examples of communication to indeterminate

audiences supports my theory of scalar ostension. The notion of scalar ostension explains,

from the perspective of the hearer, how much she presumes her stimulus to be relevant to a
possible audience and, from the hearer’s perspective, how much relevance he expects to

gain from processing the speaker’s utterance. The recognition of the degree of a speaker’s
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ostension in communication is only one part of the communicative process, and this

ostension is itself based on a combination of external and internal factors. 7 A hearer who
recognizes that a communicator intends to communicate with him still has the task of

understanding what the speaker means. As noted in Chapter 3, the task of understanding
an utterance depends on the hearer’s ability to assign communicative and informative
intentions to the speaker. In the next section, I will illustrate through the notion of

epistemic vigilance that the assignment and fulfillment of such intentions is fundamentally

rooted in the trust that a hearer places in the speaker. Then, in the subsequent section, I

will summarize how persuasion and manipulation fit within a broader communicative
theory, with particular emphasis on persuasion and manipulation across multiple
audiences.

4.3 Epistemic Vigilance

As noted in Chapter 3, speakers and hearers each have their own costs, risks, and

expected benefits when they engage in communication. While the speaker desires to

produce an effect in the hearer, there is always the risk of miscommunication. Likewise,

while the hearer desires to gain a better understanding of the world, he might not gain a
better understanding of it or, worse yet, might gain false assumptions about the world.

Interestingly, even though people typically want to know only true information 8, the

independent truth of a given assumption does not impact the individual’s cognitive

processes so long as he holds the assumption as true. Sperber and Wilson note: “From a
cognitive point of view, mistaken assumptions can be indistinguishable from genuine
7
8

This corresponds to the continuum of cases of ostension in Figure 5, page 32.

Granted, a hearer might desire to believe false assumptions if, for instance, the false assumptions

satisfy a desire that the individual ranks higher than truth. For example, an individual might want
to believe false assumptions to promote social cohesion or to avoid discomfort.
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factual knowledge, just as optical illusions can be indistinguishable from true sight”

(1995:39). Thus, if I believe that you are communicating to me in good faith when in reality
you are lying to me, I will process your utterance just as though it were true even though it

is not. Most of us have realized at some point that some assumption we had held as certain

turned out to be false.

Sophisticated communicators realize that a speaker can intend her audience to accept a

proposition that she herself does not believe. To protect themselves from being misled,
people have become epistemically vigilant; that is, they calibrate their trust to avoid

accepting false information as though it were true (Sperber et al. 2010:359; see also

Sperber 1994, 2001). The higher the degree of trust that a hearer places in a speaker, the

less processing effort that he will spend to assess the veracity of her statement. If a hearer
doubts a speaker who is actually behaving in a trustworthy manner, the hearer will spend

extra processing effort without gaining any more cognitive benefits than if he had simply

trusted her. This corresponds to case three, “inefficient processing,” in Figure 7 below.
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Figure 7. Epistemic Vigilance and Processing Cost

Speaker is
trustworthy

1. Efficient
processing

Speaker is not
trustworthy

2. Deception

Speaker is
trustworthy

3. Inefficient
processing

Speaker is not
trustworthy

4. Deception
averted

Trustworthy
Hearer thinks
speaker is...
Not
trustworthy

If, however, a hearer’s doubt is justified because the speaker is actually being

untrustworthy, and if the hearer uncovers the speaker’s untrustworthy conduct, the

avoidance of accepting false information will be worth the extra processing effort (case

four, “deception averted”). The human tendency to calibrate one’s trust in a situation to
maximize cognitive benefits while minimizing processing effort is an application of the

cognitive principle of relevance. Because human cognition is geared toward the

maximization of relevance, individuals adjust their trust based on their expectation of
trustworthiness in both the speaker and her content. In essence, the expectation of

trustworthiness is a component of the expectation of relevance. Both the speaker and the
hearer have expectations about how much they trust each other, which affects both how

much processing effort the hearer is willing to exert and how much relevant information he
expects to infer.

Sperber and his collaborators credit the human tendency toward epistemic vigilance as

being foundational to making the sharing of information worthwhile. They write, “The fact

that communication is so pervasive despite this risk [of being misinformed] suggests that
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people are able to calibrate their trust well enough to make it advantageous on average to

both communicator and audience” (Sperber et al. 2010:360). They go on to say, “Vigilance

(unlike distrust) is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite of blind trust” (2010:363).

Thus, a hearer trusts a speaker when he believes that he has good reasons to trust her, such

as on the basis of the his prior experiences with her, his estimation of her motives, the

nature of the communication, etc. Trusting reduces the effort required to process an

utterance. Likewise, the hearer is skeptical when he believes that he has good reasons to be

skeptical. The main areas of trust toward which a hearer exercises heightened epistemic

vigilance are the honesty of the source, the competence of the source, the logical accuracy of
the arguments, and the empirical truth of the content.

In the case of the Hearing, the concept of epistemic vigilance is highly relevant. While

Sperber and his collaborators coined “epistemic vigilance” mainly to describe how an

individual is careful to avoid accepting false assumptions for himself, the Hearing illustrates
that the interlocutors were vigilant in preventing their target audiences from accepting

“false” 9 assumptions. Acting on behalf of their primary audiences, the interlocutors battled
with each other to prevent “false” assumptions from entering the mutual cognitive

environment, lest their primary target audiences be led astray. Similar to how one is
skeptical of untrustworthy people or false content for oneself, so one can discredit a

proposed assumption on behalf of another individual by discrediting the source of that

assumption (competence or honesty of the speaker who supports it) or the logic or
empirical truth of the assumption itself.

9

By “false,” I am referring to any assumption that would go against the speaker’s intentions for his
primary audience, which is independent of the actual truth or falsity of the assumption in the

speaker’s mind or in the real world. For example, a “false” assumption for the CEOs would be any
assumption that would make their banks appear weak to their shareholders.
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In addition, the concept of epistemic vigilance ties in with the cognitive principle of

relevance to explain why the lack of trust reduces the efficiency of communication.

Communicators who do not trust each other exert significant amounts of processing effort
just to assess the veracity of an assumption. In the Hearing, the Representatives and the
CEOs did not cooperate with each other because they recognized that they had different

goals 10 that were not only different but also opposed to each other. For their own parts, the
CEOs and Representatives had their own beliefs and motivations so deeply entrenched that
they were unlikely to persuade or convince each other to change positions on the issues.

Therefore, the CEOs and Representatives exerted their processing effort not to assess the

veracity of assumptions for their own consideration but rather to constrain what their

primary audiences accepted as true.

Another important application of epistemic vigilance is the notion that in order to

calibrate trust efficiently, hearers learn to have a generally trusting attitude toward some

speakers whom they have consistently found to be trustworthy, and vice versa. This has
interesting implications for the importance of a speaker’s reputation (Sperber et al.
2010:370):

If we continually interact with the same people, misinforming them when it is to our
own immediate advantage may damage our reputation and end up being costly in
the long run. Conversely, doing our best to be systematically trustworthy may

sometimes be costly in the short run, but may be beneficial in the long run. The
tradeoff between the short term cost and long term benefits of a policy of

10

I am speaking specifically of their goals with regard to framing the CPP as a bailout or not.

Granted, some of their other goals may be similar, different but not opposed to each other, or
different and opposed to each other. But the other goals are not a topic for this research.
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trustworthiness may differ from person to person, depending, for instance, on the
way they discount time.

For the most part, the CEOs behaved professionally. They avoided many behaviors that
many of the Representatives engaged in shamelessly: accusation, name-calling, and

trickery. After all, the CEOs had to maintain the reputation of their institutions, for which

consistent faithfulness is more important than a quick rise and then a fall. The

Representatives, on the other hand, did not face quite as much immediate pressure; their
re-election attempts were nearly twenty-one months away. Furthermore, the

Representatives knew that the public was angry both at the banking industry and at the
government. As a result, the Representatives were willing to engage in blame-shifting

tactics to villainize the CEOs. On the other hand, the CEOs did not have a need to blame the
Representatives. As long as they could deflect blame off their particular institutions, they
did not particularly care about where the blame landed. Interpreted through the

framework of epistemic vigilance, these actions illustrate that the CEOs valued a consistent
reputation of truthfulness whereas the politicians valued short-term gains.

So far in Chapter 4 I have presented some theoretical claims about how communication

works across multiple audiences. In this section in particular, I have introduced the

Relevance Theoretic concept of epistemic vigilance to illustrate the role of trust in the

comprehension process of accepting an assumption as true. The framework of epistemic

vigilance will continue to be useful as I proceed to distinguish among informing, persuading,
and manipulating. In Section 4.4, I will elaborate on both the theory behind information

transmission and the process of informing someone of something. I will then use this model
of informing to develop further models of persuasion and manipulation.
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4.4 Informing

In speaking of “information transmission,” I have already introduced a common fallacy

about information: that it is possible to transmit or copy information from one person’s
mind to another. Such a view could be represented by the following diagram (U =

Utterance of Speaker; A = Assumption, Circle = Cognitive Environment; Overlapped Circles

= Mutual Cognitive Environment):

Figure 8. Information Transmission (Code Model)

Speaker
A

Hearer

“U”

Encodes A as U → Decodes U as A

Hearer

Speaker
A

In the diagram above, the speaker begins with an assumption in her cognitive environment

that is not in the hearer’s cognitive environment. After making an utterance, the

assumption becomes shared information. This diagram is one way to define informing, but

it is lacking in many respects. To begin, the utterance is not a code for an assumption in the

speaker’s mind. The assumption is a thought in the speaker’s mind, while the utterance is a

stimulus to help the hearer uncover her thought. The assumption(s) that the hearer

recovers after processing the utterance will not be identical to the thought in the speaker’s
mind. Rather, if the communication was successful, it will be a close resemblance to the

assumption of the speaker. In addition, any assumption that the hearer recovers will go
through further processing (provided that it was relevant to the hearer) to produce

contextual implications, contradict a prior assumption, or strengthen a prior assumption.
Thus, even if the speaker’s assumption (A) were transplanted directly into the hearer’s
mind, would we then say that the speaker informed the hearer only of (A), or also the
further assumptions that the speaker could have intended the hearer to make after
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processing (A), or all of the assumptions that the hearer actually made regardless of

whether or not the speaker intended such assumptions to be made. To model informing as

the transmission of determinate assumptions quickly becomes an absurd and impossible
model to sustain.

Rather than viewing communication as the transfer of information, Relevance Theory

views the communication process as an ostensive-inferential process. The speaker

provides an ostensive stimulus from which she expects the hearer to be able to infer

relevant information. As noted in Section 4.2, I have extended Relevance Theory to cover

communicative situations that are not fully ostensive. In Figure 9 (below) I have provided a
diagram of the communicative process. I will proceed to link each section of the diagram

with the Relevance Theoretic framework to illustrate holistically how communication
works. Then, in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, I will use this model to describe persuasive and

manipulative utterances.
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Figure 9. Relevance Theory Communication Process 11

11

Of course, the linear nature of Figure 9 is a useful lie; human communication is an interactive

process that is influenced in real time as the various items in Figure 9 influence each other and are
themselves influenced by other stimuli. This model simply provides a heuristic to look at the subprocesses involved in communication.
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4.4.1 The Intention

As noted in Figure 9, the whole communicative process begins with the desire of a

speaker to produce an effect in her audience. This corresponds to the motivation of the

speaker for entering into a communicative process. In Table 2 (Page 39) I discussed three

intentions: the ostensive intention, the communicative intention, and the informative

intention. However, both the ostensive intention and the communicative intentions are
themselves higher-order informative intentions: the intentions to (1) inform one’s

audience of the degree to which she presumes her stimulus to be relevant and (2) to inform

one’s audience of her informative intention (for the purpose of understanding the speaker’s

meaning; the actual informative intention is for accepting the speaker’s meaning). Based on
these definitions, all communication has its roots in the desire to inform someone of
something. 12

4.4.2 The Plan

The speaker who desires to produce an effect in her audience tries to choose the most

efficient and effective way to achieve her goal, balanced, of course, by the constraints of

other intentions that she values more highly. If the speaker estimates that producing an
effect in her audience would either be impossible or not worth the effort, then she will

abandon her plan and not proceed to the next stage of producing a stimulus. In the planning

stage, the speaker considers the mutual cognitive environment that she shares with the

audience to estimate how her audience will process possible stimuli that she might offer

them. She also considers the many constraints that limit the stimuli that she could offer,

constraints such as her reputation, her moral convictions, or her other goals. Remarkably,
the speaker rarely has to consider the planning process consciously. Only when the
12

Carey’s contrast between communication as transmission and communication as ritual falls

outside my scope. According to Carey’s classification, my analysis focuses on communication as
transmission rather than communication as ritual (2002).
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expected benefits are worth the high processing cost will the speaker spend much effort on

the planning phase. Most everyday speech is processed without the speaker’s awareness of
her desired effect in her audience or her plan to produce that effect.

From the speaker’s point of view, the main potential for failed communication in the

planning phase is by a misjudgment of the mutual cognitive environment. In addition to

producing a less than ideal stimulus, the misjudgment of the mutual cognitive environment
could cause a speaker to abandon a plan if she misjudges the cost or possibility of success.

While the speaker has an idea of how a hearer could process her stimulus, she cannot know

for sure because no two people share identical cognitive environments.

4.4.3 The Stimulus Offered

After creating a plan to accomplish her intentions, the speaker proceeds to carry out

her plan by offering a stimulus to the hearer. In the planning phase, the speaker has already
determined how ostensive she wants to make the stimulus. Her offering of the stimulus
could fail as a result of poor execution, such as when a speaker does not enunciate well
enough for the hearer to perceive the stimulus as intended.

4.4.4 The Stimulus Perceived

Whereas the speaker offers the stimulus, the hearer perceives and processes it. Of

course, the linear nature of my model (Figure 9) is an over-simplification of the process.

For instance, the hearer begins to perceive and process the stimulus before the speaker has
finished offering it. In fact, before the speaker has finished her utterance, the hearer may

have already anticipated the remainder of the utterance, processed it until his expectations
of relevance were met, and prepared his own reply. Thus, the linear nature of this model
(Figure 9) is simply to provide a heuristic of the various sub-processes involved in the

process of communication.
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At the stage of the hearer’s perceiving the stimulus, the communication could fail if the

hearer either misperceives the stimulus, such as when background noise prohibits the
accurate perception of an utterance. Or, perhaps the hearer’s perceptive abilities are
impaired in a way that is not manifest to the speaker. In the case of a covert or only

partially ostensive stimulus, the hearer might not even recognize the stimulus or might not
find it as relevant even if recognized, thus leading to communication failure.

4.4.5 Processing for Ostension

To help the hearer form his expectations of relevance, he will assess how ostensively—

if at all—the stimulus was communicated to him. The hearer perceives that a speaker

presumes her utterance (or other stimulus) to be relevant to him to the degree that she
ostensifies her communicative intention. If he concludes that the stimulus was not

ostensively communicated to him, then he will continue to process the stimulus only if he
independently finds it worth processing further. As soon as he stops deriving contextual

effects, he stops.

A communication could fail (at least partially) if the hearer does not perceive the same

level of ostension that the speaker presumed to have offered. This would be the result of a
mismatch in their mutual cognitive environments.

When assessing a stimulus for scalar ostension—especially a stimulus that is intended

for multiple audiences—the hearer considers both direct evidence (such as the fact that the
speaker is addressing the hearer directly) and indirect evidence (such as the fact that the

speaker’s utterance does not achieve much relevance for the hearer but achieves a lot of
relevance for another audience member). This corresponds to the concept of scalar
ostension that I presented in Section 4.2.
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4.4.6 Processing for Understanding

As part of the inference process, the hearer also tries to understand the speaker’s

intended meaning. The hearer follows the path of least effort in computing cognitive effects
until his expectations have been satisfied or abandoned. In the case of a non-ostensive

stimulus, the hearer takes responsibility for his own presumption of relevance.

4.4.7 Processing for Acceptance

As the hearer infers meaning from the stimulus, he decides to what degree he will

accept the inferred meaning as true. This depends on his trust in the source’s honesty and

competence, his trust in the logic of any arguments, or his trust in the empirical truth of the

content. In the case of non-ostensive communication, the hearer assesses his trust in his

own observational skills (the empirical truth of the content), reasoning abilities, motives,

and competence.

4.4.8 Processing for Additional Relevance

The hearer continues to process a stimulus until he no longer receives adequate

cognitive effects for his processing effort. In other words, each newly derived assumption

will itself be a stimulus available to the hearer for additional processing. If the hearer finds

the newly derived assumption more relevant than other stimuli, he will continue to process
it as long as he perceives it to be the most relevant stimulus to process at the time. If there
are other stimuli that are immediately available but would be lost forever if not processed
immediately, a hearer might postpone the processing of such a stimulus and resume

processing it later on when the stimulus resumes its status as the stimulus in which the
hearer has the highest expectations of relevance.

4.5 Persuading

In Section 4.4 I described the Relevance Theoretic account of informing someone of

something. Based on the model in Figure 9 (Page 48), this begins as an intention in the
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speaker’s mind to produce a desired effect in the hearer. To what extent, if at all, is

informing different from persuading? In terms of the communication model, there is no

difference. After all, in persuading, one also wants to produce a desired effect in the hearer.
Thus, within the Relevance Theoretic framework there is no need to appeal to a special

model for persuasive communication (for an alternative view, see Taillard 2000, 2002). In

Relevance Theory, the fulfillment of the communicative intention results in understanding,
while the fulfillment of the informative intention results in acceptance. To successfully

persuade someone, then, is simply to have one’s informative intention fulfilled. Any appeal
to a persuasive intention is, then, just a nuanced version of the informative intention.

While there is no linguistic basis for a distinction between persuading and informing,

the concept of epistemic vigilance helps to explain the nuanced difference between

informing and persuading that we experience in everyday speech. Specifically, the

difference between informing and persuading is in the expected or perceived degree of
vigilance exercised by the hearer, from the speaker’s and hearer’s perspectives,

respectively. The amount of vigilance, in turn, is dependent on the amount of trust in the
source or the content.

Figure 10. Distinction between Informing and Persuading

Inform

Persuade

Low Vigilance

High Vigilance

High Trust

Low Trust

Accordingly, the less vigilance expected (by the speaker) or exerted (by the hearer), the

more a communicative exchange resembles mere informing. Conversely, the more vigilance

expected (by the speaker) or exerted (by the hearer), the more a communicative exchange
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resembles persuasion. In this nuanced definition, the degree to which a stimulus is deemed
to be persuasive is decided independently by the speaker and the hearer. The Relevance

Theory communication model in Figure 9 (Page 48) fully accounts for the impact of trust on

communication by considering the epistemic vigilance of the hearer. The speaker takes the
hearer’s epistemic vigilance into account during her planning phase, while the hearer
exercises epistemic vigilance throughout his processing sub-tasks.

Because my definition of persuasion is linked to the concept of trust, I take for granted

that most of the utterances from the Hearing were of a persuasive nature because of the

lack of trust among the direct and indirect participants. I will now turn to an example of

persuasive tactics from the Hearing. In this example, Rep. Cleaver employs a clever use of

direct quotations to insult the CEOs without claiming responsibility for the legitimacy of the

opinions expressed. I have divided his comment below into seven sections (18a-g), the first
and last of which (18a,g) are bookends that explain the direct quotations from his

constituents in (18b-f) (Hearing:76-77):
18.

(a) I have about seven pages of questions that were sent to me from my

districts. I represent Kansas City, Missouri, and Independence, Missouri.

(b) ‘‘How dare you!’’—Judy from Kansas City.

(c) “Why are you squeezing us dry with fees and increasing credit card rates
but lining your own pockets?”—Alice from Raymore.

(d) “Since you are the experts with the big pay, why did you screw up?”—Ben.
(e) “How big is your yacht?”—Michelle.

(f) “Do you really believe that you are that smart?”

(g) I read these only because I think everybody conveyed to you that people are
angry.
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After declaring that he had seven pages of questions from his constituents, Rep. Cleaver

chose five comments (18b-f) as being particularly relevant to the conversation. Thus, he

claims responsibility for presuming that these comments would be of some relevance to his

various audiences. However, by directly quoting others, he does not claim responsibility for
the truth of what his constituents expressed. After quoting them, he even explains that he
has read these comments to reinforce the fact that his constituents are angry at the CEOs.

In terms of the external (direct/“showing”) evidence of Rep. Cleaver’s ostension, Rep.

Cleaver gives direct evidence to the CEOs that he is talking to them by addressing them

directly. Even some internal (indirect/“telling”) evidence reveals that he has an informative

intention. Specifically, he states in (18g) that he expects his utterances (18b-f) to achieve
relevance by informing the CEOs that people are angry at them. In regard to the

presumption of relevance, however, the internal evidence suggests that Rep. Cleaver likely

presumes his utterance to communicate only some, but not optimal, relevance to the CEOs.
To begin, the fact that the public was angry at the CEOs was already manifest to the CEOs.
This fact did not need more reinforcement at this point in the Hearing, which was about
three-fourths of the way through the daylong Hearing during which the CEOs were

constantly reminded of the anger of the American people. Further, Rep. Cleaver could not
have expected to convince the CEOs of the veracity of his constituents’ insults. Surely, he

realized that these insults would come up against beliefs that the CEOs held more strongly,
resulting in the dismissal of the propositions expressed in the insults in (18b-f).

While the anger of Rep. Cleaver’s constituents was not highly relevant to the CEOs, Rep.

Cleaver’s comments were highly relevant to his constituents. Indeed, Rep. Cleaver quoted
his constituents to let them know that he had been listening to them, that he found their

comments important, and that he was being a faithful Representative by voicing their
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concerns. In addition, their direct quotations supplied additional support to his argument

that the CEOs were not trustworthy.

The CEOs, however, were aware that this was a public hearing and that the

Representatives had split intentions. Therefore, the CEOs undoubtedly realized that Rep.
Cleaver had intended his comments to be relevant primarily to his constituents. After
making this realization, they would have abandoned further pursuits of finding much

relevance for themselves.

Below I have included an abbreviated form of the Relevance Theory communication

model that I presented in Figure 9, Page 48.
Process

Intention

Develop Plan

Table 3. Rep. Cleaver’s Utterance to Multiple Audiences 13
CEOs

Rep. Cleaver desires the CEOs to
accept as true the fact that his
constituents are angry with them.

Constituents

Rep. Cleaver desires his constituents
to accept as true the fact that he is a
good Representative.

Rep. Cleaver plans to quote some of the comments from his constituents.

Offer Stimulus Rep. Cleaver recites the direct quotations from his constituents.
Perceive
Constituents perceive the
Stimulus
CEOs perceive the utterances.
utterances.
Infer
Meaning

CEOs infer that Rep. Cleaver wants
them to know that his constituents
are angry with them. (This
assumption was obvious to them
before Rep. Cleaver’s utterance.)
CEOs infer that Rep. Cleaver must
have intended his comments to be
relevant primarily to his
constituents.

The constituents infer that Rep.
Cleaver is voicing their concerns and
is therefore a good Representative.
The constituents infer that there are
a lot of good reasons to be angry
with the CEOs and to blame them for
the financial crisis. The constituents
find Rep. Cleaver’s utterance highly
relevant.

Table 3 (above) illustrates that Rep. Cleaver was able to accomplish multiple intentions

with a single utterance. By being at least somewhat relevant to multiple audiences, Rep.
13

Of course, this is all based on my analysis of the text and may not reflect the speaker’s actual

intentions or the hearers’ inferred meaning.

56

Cleaver left his precise intentions inexplicit and allowed the various audiences to read as

much or as little as they wanted to into his intentions. This allows him to be persuasive

without proof of his intentions. If he were accused of insulting the CEOs, he could deny it,
stating that he was simply passing along comments from his constituents. If he were

accused of false flattery toward his constituents, he could deny that as well, stating that he

was simply trying to convey their anger to the CEOs so that they would behave better.

Generally speaking, the presence of multiple audiences makes it harder to prove a speaker’s

intentions than if the speaker were speaking to only a single hearer. As a result, it also
makes it easier for a speaker to deny that she even had a particular intention.

My goal is not to come up with a fully classificatory definition of persuasion or to

review various theories of persuasion. Rather, my goal is to provide a Relevance-Theoretic
account of persuasion to illustrate that the intuitive notions about the difference between

informing and persuading are best explained by an appeal to epistemic vigilance, which is

essentially an appeal to trust. Because Relevance Theory accounts for the role of epistemic
vigilance in communication, it is an ideal model to analyze intuitively persuasive

communicative exchanges across multiple audiences. In Section 4.6, I will proceed to

provide a Relevance Theoretic account of manipulation.

4.6 Manipulating

Similar to my conclusions on persuasion, I also contend that manipulation does not

constitute a linguistically distinct type of communication. Rather than being a linguistic

distinction, the intuitive notions of manipulation actually depend on the correlation

between speaker belief and speaker meaning, which is a consideration of a fact in the world
that is independent of the linguistic form of the utterance. 14 From the perspective of a
14

Here I am dealing specifically with deception, which is a clear case of manipulation. It is also

possible to consider manipulation apart from deception, such as when one manipulates by means

57

speaker, her communicated stimulus is manipulative to the extent that she intends the
hearer to accept assumptions as true that she herself believes to be false. 15 From the

perspective of the hearer, a perceived stimulus is manipulative to the extent that the hearer

believes that the speaker intends him to believe something that the speaker herself does not
believe. The following remark by Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf, quoted earlier as Example
(11), helps to illustrate this point:

11. Mr. Stumpf: “We are Americans first, and we are bankers second.”

19. Mr. Stumpf’s intentions in uttering (11): to inform the audiences that the CEOs

have the best interests of the country as a higher ranked priority than their own
banks’ profitability; to inform the audiences that the CEOs would not take
advantage of the American people.

It is possible that Mr. Stumpf sincerely believes the message that he is trying to

communicate to his various audiences. It is also possible that he does not believe the

assumptions that he is trying to communicate. To the extent that he does not believe what

he intended his audiences to believe, his utterance could be considered manipulative. Each

individual can have a different perception of the degree to which a stimulus is manipulative.
For example, Mr. Stumpf might personally believe that which he intended his audience to

of power but does not need to conceal the manipulation. In any event, whether manipulation

involves deception or not, the manipulative speech does not constitute a linguistically distinct type
15

of communication.

I have worded my definition of manipulation carefully to avoid any correlation to actual truth. For

instance, Gibbs and Bryant (2008) found that people tend to give rounded answers when asked for
the time in order to optimize relevance for the hearer. Telling someone that the time is noon when
it is 11:58 a.m. would not be manipulation by my definition unless the speaker expected the hearer
to believe that the time was exactly noon.
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believe. Yet the Representatives might believe that he is merely purporting to believe it

even though he probably does not. In such a case, Mr. Stumpf would view his utterance as
non-manipulative, while the Representatives would view it as (at least somewhat)
manipulative.

As another important consideration, a manipulative stimulus might be offered either

ostensively or non-ostensively (covertly). For example, a lie that is ostensively and

intentionally communicated to someone would be manipulation. In covert communication,
part of the speaker’s intended meaning is that the hearer would detect a level of ostension
different from what the speaker knows to be true. By my definition of manipulation,
therefore, intentional covert communication is always manipulative.

Further, my definition of manipulation states nothing about the ethics of manipulation.

For example, a teacher might give her student a hint to a test problem but not want the

student to realize that he received a hint, preferring that the student thinks he came up with
the clue on his own. Because the teacher’s ostensive intention was different from what she
wanted her student to infer, she manipulated him; but that does not make her behavior

unethical. Indeed, it is not my goal to comment on the ethics of communication. Rather, I
simply desire to show that the manipulative nature of a communication (according to my

definition) does not impact the cognitive processes involved in producing or understanding
a stimulus. It very well may affect the results of the communication process, but the

utterance itself is still processed using the same process as any utterance. Therefore, the
same Relevance Theory model that I presented in Chapter 3 and Section 4.4 applies to

manipulative just as well as to non-manipulative communicative exchanges.

This chapter has been mostly the presentation of theories about how communication

works, with a particular emphasis on how it works across multiple audiences. In the next
chapter (Chapter 5), I will use the theories laid out so far to analyze how the CEOs and
59

Representatives tried to persuade their audiences concerning the nature of the Capital
Purchase Plan (CPP): Was it a bailout or not?

60

Chapter 5

LEXICAL CHOICES: WAS IT A BAILOUT?

As stated in Section 4.1, the CEOs and Representatives altered their speech in

consideration of the other audiences who had access to their utterances. Because there

were multiple audiences involved, the Representatives and CEOs had split intentions. One

of the central claims of this paper is that the Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption
of optimal relevance should be reformulated to account for such split intentions toward

multiple audiences. I addressed this issue by positing the notion of scalar ostension

(Section 4.2), which states that an audience considers both external (manner of delivery)

and internal (content of the utterance) evidence in determining the degree to which the
speaker presumes her utterance to be optimally relevant. The consideration of how an

utterance is relevant to another audience is a key consideration in determining how much

relevance a hearer expects to find for himself.

In this chapter, I will turn my attention to the lexical choices of the interlocutors. The

CEOs, for their part, remained steadfast in their use of terms that constrained their

audiences to view them in a positive way. The Representatives, on the other hand,

consistently used terminology that carried negative implicatures regarding the CEOs. The

same Relevance Theoretic concepts of communication that apply to understanding the

meaning of an utterance also apply to understanding the meaning of a word. The word

choice patterns of the interlocutors reveal their intentions regarding what they want their
audiences to believe with regard to this central question: Was the CPP a bailout or not?

This question could be stated another way: Are the banks to blame for the financial crisis?
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One subtle persuasive device that both interlocutors wielded was their terminology in

referring to the CPP. On a technical note, the CPP was structured as an investment by the
US government in various banks. The banks who received investments were required to

pay dividends to the government (similar to the interest payments on a loan); thus, the CPP

investments were by no means free to the banks. In addition, the banks were expected to
repurchase their investments from the government as soon as the financial system had

stabilized. On another note, some of the banks who received investments under the CPP
told the US government that they did not even want the government’s money, yet they

ended up accepting it anyway to show support for the government’s efforts to stabilize the
financial system.

While the fact that the CPP was structured as an investment was mutually manifest to

both sets of interlocutors, the Representatives used a wide variety of terms to suggest that
the CPP investment was more like a free government handout that the government was
coerced into providing. The term bailout, for instance, is a metaphor with negative

connotations toward the entity being bailed out. Bailout can refer to the process of

removing water from a sinking ship. It can also refer to the posting of a payment on behalf

of someone who has been accused of a wrongdoing so that he can be released from police

custody until he stands trial. Granted, the term bailout has become so pervasive that it has
become less like a creative metaphor and more like a conventionalized idiom (see

Pilkington 2000:100-108). The dictionary publisher Merriam-Webster selected bailout

(defined as “a rescue from financial distress”) as its word of the year for 2008, citing that

bailout “received the highest intensity of lookups on Merriam-Webster online over the

shortest period of time.” 16 Regardless of the imagery that the term bailout evokes, it
16

Merriam-Webster Online. “Word of the Year 2008.” http://www/merriam-webster.com/info/

08words.htm. Last accessed on July 14, 2011.
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definitely has negative connotations with regard to the entity being bailed out. Perhaps the
best proof of this is the fact that the CEOs themselves refused to use the term bailout. The

table below shows the use of the bailout terminology during the Hearing with reference to
the CPP/TARP 17:

#

Speaker

1 Rep. Barrett
Rep.
2 Neugebauer
Rep.
3 Hensarling
Rep.
4 Hensarling
5 Rep. Garrett
6 Rep. Garrett

7 Rep. McCotter
8 Rep. McCotter
9 Rep. Baca

10 Rep. Baca
11 Rep. Baca

12 Rep. Lynch
13 Rep. Lynch

14 Rep. Speier
17

Table 4. Bailout Terminology

Utterance
[my constituents] are not getting bailed out [like you
were]
there has been a lot of focus on all the bailout
activities

Page

now we have bailed them out
the federal government stepped in and helped bail
out AIG
what was the need of the [Federal Reserve] to step in
at that point to bail them out?
the reports about the failure of the Wall Street
bailout to date has caused a lot of concern.
It is so difficult for [my constituents] to get credit
despite the Wall Street bailout that they were told
would work.

44

Many said that Congress would never bail them out

How do you feel about the bailout?

Do you feel the bailout was necessary?
We [the federal government] are the ones who have
to bail you out because of what you've done
[My constituents] are being asked to bail the banks
out, you folks out
[Is there a way to avoid putting] all these bailouts on
the backs of the American taxpayer?
the biggest financial institutions both in size and in
their bailout receipts

7

27
44
47
48
53
53
63
63
64
68
68
93

The CPP was one program under the broader umbrella of TARP. In Table 4, I include uses of the

term bailout for both CPP funds and other references to TARP. The interlocutors frequently

interchanged the terms TARP and CPP even though the CPP was only one component of TARP.
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Of the fourteen references to the TARP funds as a bailout, all of the speakers were

Representatives. Indeed, the CEOs never used this term. To do so would have been to
admit guilt. Rather, the CEOs preferred to refer to the TARP funds in more technical

terminology. Table 5 (below) shows the various speakers who referred to TARP funds as a
government investment in the banks. Referring to the TARP funds as an investment
highlighted the mutual benefit of the deal: the US government earned returns on its

investments in the banks, while the CEOs benefited from the ability to use the government’s
investment to earn an additional profit. Of particular note, all eight CEOs used this

language.

Key Speaker

1 Rep. Frank
Rep.
2 Neugebauer

3 CEO Blankfein
4 CEO Blankfein
5 CEO Blankfein
6 CEO Dimon
7 CEO Kelly
8 CEO Kelly

9 CEO Lewis

10 CEO Lewis

11 CEO Logue
12 CEO Logue

Table 5. Investment Terminology

Utterance
we need to get…the government investment out of
the banks as soon as we can.

the American people have invested in your entities
receiving this investment under the Capital Purchase
Program

Page
4
9
9

receiving the government's investment
We look forward to paying back the government's
investment

10

in exchange for the [US Government's] $3 investment
We also fully intend to deliver a very good return on
investment to taxpayers.

13

the investment the government made to us in TARP

investors, including taxpayers, can earn returns
generate returns for investors, now including US
taxpayers

the taxpayers' investment
we are pleased to have an opportunity to describe
our use of [the CPP] investment
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11
11
14
14
15
15
15

Key Speaker

13 CEO Logue
14 CEO Mack
15 CEO Mack

16 CEO Pandit
17 CEO Pandit
18 CEO Pandit
19 CEO Pandit

20 CEO Stumpf
21 CEO Stumpf
22 CEO Stumpf

23 CEO Stumpf

Table 5. Investment Terminology (cont.)

Utterance
our $2 billion investment from the Capital Purchase
Program

the TARP investment
as a recipient of an investment from the US
government…
[the American people] have a right to expect a return
on this investment
we are committed to providing the American public a
return on its investment
We will pay the US government $3.4 billion in annual
dividends on that investment.
our goal, my goal, is to make this a profitable
investment for the American people
the US Treasury invested in Wells Fargo

the investment by the government
we will use the investment by the government to
help make more loans

25 Rep. Bacchus

this taxpayer investment
an investment in the future economic growth of our
country
this is going to be one of [the taxpayers'] best
investments

27 Rep. Sherman

The first $254 billion of TARP money was invested

24 CEO Stumpf

26 Rep. Bacchus

28 Rep. Sherman
29 CEO Pandit
30 CEO Pandit

we are going to make money on that investment

as much as the Treasury was investing
my goal is to make this an extremely profitable
investment for the US government
we are paying $3.4 billion annually as dividends on
this investment

Page
16
17
17
18
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
24
24
49
49
50
50

What is particularly interesting is that all of the CEOs consistently used investment

terminology to the exclusion of bailout terminology, which was used exclusively by the

Representatives. The bailout and investment terminologies were at odds with each other:
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Figure 11. Bailout vs. Investment

Figure 11 illustrates each speaker’s desire to control how the CPP was conceptualized by

the various audiences of the event: Was it a bailout or an investment?

Continuing in the review of lexical choices, I will focus on the use of SPEND. 18 After

reviewing three possible senses of SPEND, I will review the use of SPEND in the Hearing.
Consider SPEND as used in the following sentences (20a-d) and corresponding to the
senses defined in (21a-c):
20.

(a) SPEND*: Thomas SPENT* $10 on a pizza.

(b) SPEND**: Thomas SPENT** $10 by loaning it to his brother, who will pay
him back in three days.

(c) SPEND***: Thomas SPENT*** $20 today: $10 to buy a pizza for lunch and
$10 to loan to his brother.

(d) SPEND*,**,***: Thomas SPENT*/SPENT**/SPENT*** $10 by loaning it to his
21.

18

brother.

(a) SPEND*: to pay out for an expense (no direct relation to an expectation of
future cash inflows)

By placing a word in all capital letters, I am referring to the use of the word in the complete variety

of acceptable uses within the word’s semantic range of meaning. For a specific sense of the word, I
will place a consistent number of asterisks after the word.
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(b) SPEND**: to pay out for an asset; to invest (a direct relation to an
expectation of future cash inflows)

(c) SPEND***: to pay out (for any purpose)

In Example (20a), the sense of SPEND* is such that Thomas gives $10 to someone in

exchange for a pizza, and the person to whom he gives the $10 will not give it back to him.

The $10 now belongs to the seller of the pizza, and in exchange for the $10, Thomas has a
pizza. In abstract terms, this could be considered an investment in the pizza, which will
provide Thomas with energy that will help him to earn additional money. However, a

crucial characteristic of SPEND* is the short-term nature of the acquired benefit. While

theoretically possible, it would sound awkward to say that Thomas invested $10 in a pizza

without changing the meaning of the sentence, for instance, to mean that Thomas intended
to sell the slices of the pizza in exchange for a profit.

In the case of (20b), however, the sense of SPEND** is such that it could be replaced by

the word invest. The difference between SPEND* and SPEND** can be addressed easily by
answering the following questions: Was it for a short-term benefit such as a meal (in

accounting terminology, this would be labeled an expense and equate to SPEND*), or was it

expected to result in future cash inflows (which, in accounting terms, would be an asset and

equate to SPEND**)? This distinction is noted well by Example (20d). Someone who knew
that Thomas’ brother had a history of not repaying loans could utter (20d, SPEND*) to

mean that Thomas will never see his $10 again. In another instance, someone who expected

Thomas’ brother to repay the loan would utter (20d) in the sense of SPEND**. Still,
someone else could utter (20d) in the sense of SPEND*** without making any value
judgment about whether or not Thomas’ brother is likely to repay the loan.

It is worth asking how many possible senses of SPEND there are. Would it not be more

accurate to consider all senses of SPEND to have the basic meaning of SPEND***, which is
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vague and could apply to all cases? In such a view, the subtle distinctions between SPEND*
and SPEND** could be settled by contextual factors. While such a view is appealing in its
simplicity and consistency, it fails to describe the cognitive processes that are involved in

inferring meaning from words. As a brief explanation, just as an utterance is offered as a
clue from which a hearer can infer the speaker’s meaning, so also a word is a clue from

which the hearer can infer meaning that may be broader (SPEND*** as in to pay out for any
purpose) or narrower (SPEND** as in to pay out for an asset; to invest) in a given context.
While a word is partly a code, the actual meaning of a word is only partially encoded; the
rest of the meaning is inferred from context. (For more on how the meaning of a word is

fine-tuned in context, see the Relevance Theory literature on lexical pragmatics in Wilson
2003 and Wilson and Carston 2007.)

In the Hearing, there were four uses of SPEND that referred specifically to how the

banks used the money that the government invested in them through the Capital Purchase
Program. These uses are listed below:
Key Speaker
1 Rep. Kanjorski
2 Rep. Barrett

3 Rep. Biggert
4 Rep. Frank

Table 6. SPEND Terminology

Utterance
today we will learn how some of the richest and most
powerful men in America are spending billions of
dollars of taxpayer money
you owe my constituents some explanation on…how
you spent their money
We don’t believe that taxpayer money has been spent
wisely
if you think you are being ill-treated by our requests
that you tell us how you spent it [CPP money], we
will take it back

Page
5
6
7
22

To no one’s surprise, only the Representatives used SPEND to describe how the banks put
the government’s money to work. The CEOs would not use SPEND to describe how they

used the CPP funds because of the possible ambiguity in how SPEND could be interpreted:

68

22.

(a) SPEND*: The money was paid out, and now it is gone. The implication is

that the banks are running out of money and will not be able to repay the

taxpayers.

(b) SPEND** : The money was invested; it is expected to be repaid. The

implication is that the banks are being faithful managers of the taxpayers’
money. The taxpayers will be repaid with interest.

(c) SPEND***: The money was paid out. The implication is that the speaker is
not making a value judgment on whether or not the money will be repaid.

Because the CEOs could use the term invest to constrain the implicatures to the favorable

ones of SPEND** (22b) without the associated risks of the negative implicatures of SPEND*
(22a), they avoided the use of SPEND altogether, preferring to use investment terminology

instead. Further, the CEO’s investment terminology emphasized that the taxpayers were

likely to make a profit from their investment in the banks, thus implying that the taxpayers
were beneficiaries rather than victims.

Overall, the Representatives exploited the multiple senses of SPEND to encourage

audience members to view the CEOs as having SPENT* (paid out and used up) the CPP

funds, which portrays them as being financially irresponsible and, therefore, worthy of

blame for the state of the financial crisis. The stark contrast between the CEOs’ and the
Representatives’ lexical choices supports my view that the CEOs used the more specific

investment terminology to limit the implicatures of the various audiences, while the

Representatives used the more negative bailout terminology and the ambiguous

SPEND*/SPEND**/SPEND*** terminology because they intended their constituents to infer
a range of possible meanings based on their varied expectations.

In this chapter I have reviewed the impact that multiple audiences have on a speaker’s

lexical choices. By using a word with multiple established senses, the Representatives gave
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their hearers the option to infer a negative sense of the word SPEND* (the CEOs SPENT* the

taxpayers’ money, and now it is gone) while also allowing the more accurate sense SPEND**
(the CEOs invested/SPENT** the taxpayers’ money and intend to pay it back with interest).
To the extent that the Representatives were trying to imply SPEND* when they actually

believed SPEND**, they were also being manipulative according to my definition in Section

4.6.

70

Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS

My analysis of persuasive and manipulative communication across multiple audiences

has several implications for how to apply Relevance Theory to situations that are less than

fully ostensive. To begin, in Section 4.1 I illustrated that the presences of multiple audiences
results in the existence of multiple cognitive environments. To the extent that different
assumptions are mutually manifest between a speaker and her various audiences, the

speaker may intend her various audiences to infer different meanings from her utterance.

When a communicator addresses multiple audiences simultaneously, she does not typically

presume her utterance to be equally relevant to all of them. This presents a problem for the

Relevance Theoretic notion of the presumption of optimal relevance.

To resolve this issue, I proposed the notion of scalar ostension in Section 4.2. The

notion of scalar ostension posits that a speaker can communicate that she is offering less

than optimal relevance to her various addressees. Further, in offering a scale of relevance

to her audiences, the speaker uses both external (manner of delivery) and internal (content
of the stimulus) clues to help her audiences detect the degree to which they should expect

the stimulus to be relevant to them. The clarification of the different types of ostension
(external and internal) resolves another problem with the presumption of optimal

relevance, namely that the hearer assumes that the speaker is attempting to be optimally
relevant before the hearer even begins to process the stimulus. In cases of multiple

audiences, however, this presents a problem because the hearer does not always expect
that the speaker is attempting to be optimally relevant specifically to him. In such
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instances, the hearer expects that the speaker is attempting to offer him some, but not

optimal, relevance. As a result, the hearer places some level of responsibility on the speaker

and considers the speaker to be communicating poorly or deceptively if his expectations of

relevance are not satisfied. However, because he recognizes that the speaker is offering him

only some (not optimal) relevance, he takes responsibility for some of his own expectations
of relevance.

Further, by appealing to the role of internal evidence, I emphasized that the hearer

adjusts his expectations of relevance throughout his processing of the utterance. The

hearer revises his expectation of relevance in real time along with his attempt at inferring

meaning, adjusting both the expectation of relevance and the recovery of relevance until the
hearer gains sufficient benefits and then stops processing.

In the remainder of Chapter 4, I offered a comprehensive model of the communicative

process with an emphasis on persuasive and manipulative communication across multiple
audiences. In Section 4.4 I provided a Relevance Theoretic account of informing someone
of something that incorporates my notion of scalar ostension. Then, in Section 4.5 I

proposed a Relevance Theoretic distinction between informing and persuading that is

rooted in the notions of trust and epistemic vigilance (see also Section 4.3) and not based

on any linguistic factor. I concluded Chapter 4 by providing a Relevance Theoretic account

of manipulation (specifically deception) that is rooted in the correspondence between a

speaker’s implied meaning and a speaker’s actual beliefs. Throughout Chapter 4 I applied

my accounts of informing, persuading, and manipulating to communication that is aimed at
multiple audiences.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I provided an extended example of how the presence of multiple

audiences affects the speaker’s word choice so that a speaker can intend a specific word to
mean different things to different people.
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My analysis has some profound applications for Relevance Theory. Specifically, by

detangling the ostensive intention from the communicative intention (Table 2, Page 39), I

have suggested a basis for expanding the domain of Relevance Theory to communicative

situations that are only partially ostensive or that may not even be ostensive at all. To my
knowledge, my work is unique in the way that I attempt to apply Relevance Theory to

communication across multiple audiences. As a result, I am sure that the theories that I
have proposed would benefit from additional research and refinement.

In addition to promoting additional applications to Relevance Theory, I have attempted

to provide a model for analyzing communicative situations across multiple audiences. I

intend for my descriptions of persuasion and manipulation to be of value to anyone who is
studying how persuasion and manipulation function across multiple audiences.
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